



MAS

PALESTINE ECONOMIC POLICY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE (MAS)

Palestine Economic Update

July 2024

Key Messages – Three Hundred Days and Counting

- 300 days of an escalating war that risks genocide have resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis, and the situation is rapidly deteriorating each day.
- Entry of humanitarian truckloads into the Gaza Strip, which was already insufficient to meet the soaring needs, dropped to less than half after Israel invaded and seized control of the Rafah border crossing.
- Recent months have seen significant increases in settlement activity, a drastic shift in Israeli spatial planning powers in the West Bank, and an expansion of Israeli authority over Palestinian archaeological sites throughout the territory, all of which contribute to the erosion of Palestinian land and rights while imposing a de facto annexation of the West Bank.
- Signaling a market response to the crisis, the Al Rabyeh Animal Feed and Grain Factory exemplifies efforts to reduce import dependency and enhance local production, contributing to economic resilience amidst war-induced economic hardships.

This publication is published with support of
Arab Palestinian Investment Company



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1. Humanitarian Situation Update

As Israel continues to wage its war on the Gaza Strip, the death toll has surged to over 39,258, around 70% of which are children and women, with more than 10 thousand missing under the rubble and 90,589 injured.¹ In the West Bank, 590 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli forces and settlers since October 2023, 138 of which are children. These and other destructive outcomes have resulted in Israel being charged in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with committing acts that risk leading to genocide.²

According to the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), the population growth rate in the Gaza Strip is expected to drop to 1% in 2024 compared to 2.7% in 2023.³ This is due to a significant drop in birth rate and crude marriage rates, along with a rise in mortality rates. The war has already altered the age and gender structure of the population, and its impacts will persist for years.

1.1 Displacement

- Israel is continuously issuing new evacuation orders as it intensifies its attacks across the Gaza Strip, forcing people to flee under fire and bombardments.⁴
- On 10 July, the Israeli military dropped leaflets over Gaza City, the largest in the Gaza Strip with an estimated population of 750 thousand before the war, ordering all its remaining 250 thousand residents to evacuate.⁵
- On 27 July, the Israeli military issued evacuation orders in Khan Younis in the Southern Gaza Strip, where displaced people have been forced to shelter, displacing at least 180 thousand Palestinians.⁶

1 https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/lang_en/1405/default.

2 <https://tinyurl.com/z37th66w>

3 <https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post.aspx?lang=en&ItemID=5791>

4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Strip_evacuations

5 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/10/>

6 <https://tinyurl.com/ysek3vbw>

- As of 22 July, nearly 83% of the Gaza Strip has been placed under evacuation orders or designated as “no-go zones” by the Israeli military.⁷
- About 1.9mn people, or 85% of the Gaza Strip’s pre-war population, are internally displaced, including people who have been displaced up to nine or ten times.⁸ About 100 thousand households are estimated to need shelter support urgently.

1.2 Destruction

- As of 3 July, satellite data shows that 59% of all buildings in the Gaza Strip were likely damaged or destroyed.⁹ More than 70% of buildings in the northern Gaza Strip are likely damaged or destroyed.
- According to PCBS, out of an estimated pre-war housing stock of 450 thousand units, more than 150 thousand housing units in the Gaza Strip were totally destroyed, an additional 80 thousand housing units are uninhabitable, and 200 thousand housing units were partially destroyed.¹⁰ 195 government headquarters and 206 archaeological and heritage sites were destroyed.
- Based on images collected on 29 May, the UN Satellite Centre identified approximately 1,100km of destroyed roads, 350km of severely affected roads, and 1,470km of moderately affected roads.¹¹ Approximately 65% of the road network in Gaza has been damaged.
- As of 5 June, around 60% of assessed WASH infrastructures were damaged or destroyed.¹²
- By June 2024, 63% of the cropland and 33% of the greenhouse area in the Gaza Strip were likely damaged.¹³

7 <https://tinyurl.com/ymurnt46>

8 <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/reported-impact-snapshot>

9 <https://www.conflict-damage.org/>

10 <https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post>

11 <https://tinyurl.com/yykcjhde>

12 <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/reported-impact-snapshot>

13 <https://tinyurl.com/33587bsy>

1.3 Food Insecurity and Malnutrition

- Between 1 May and 15 June, about 2.13 million people across the Gaza Strip, or 95% of the analyzed population, faced high levels of acute food insecurity classified in IPC Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse), including nearly 343,000 people who experienced catastrophic food insecurity (IPC Phase 5).¹⁴
- By 25 June, at least 34 people, most of whom are children, have died from starvation.¹⁵
- As of 22 July, 113 patients were admitted to hospitals due to severe malnutrition
- UN Women estimates that at least 557,000 women in Gaza are facing severe food insecurity.¹⁶

1.4 Health Access and Spread of Diseases

- As of 22 July, only 16 out of 36 hospitals in Gaza were partially functional, 11 of which were partially accessible.¹⁷ The Gaza Strip had four partially functional and four fully functional field hospitals. Only 48 out of 107 primary healthcare facilities were functional.
- As of 7 July, there have been almost a million cases of acute respiratory infections, 577 thousand cases of diarrhea, and 107 thousand cases of acute jaundice syndrome or suspected hepatitis A.¹⁸
- On 19 July, poliovirus, a disease eradicated in much of the world, was detected in wastewater samples in Gaza.¹⁹

1.5 Entry of Aid

- Entry of food and aid into the Gaza Strip, which was already insufficient to meet the

¹⁴ <https://tinyurl.com/4kn4j2fv>

¹⁵ <https://tinyurl.com/ye25whk3>

¹⁶ <https://tinyurl.com/5dfeckca>

¹⁷ <https://tinyurl.com/2hvfwa8>

¹⁸ <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/reported-impact-snapshot>

¹⁹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/19/israel>

soaring needs, dropped significantly after Israel invaded and seized control of Gaza's vital Rafah border crossing on 7 May. According to OCHA, 2,295 humanitarian truckloads entered Gaza in June 2024, a 54.6% decrease compared to April 2024.²⁰

- Between 1 and 21 July, only 2,165,590 liters of fuel entered Gaza. This is far below the estimated 400,000 liters needed daily for humanitarian activities in the Gaza Strip.²¹ Only 1,646 humanitarian truckloads entered Gaza over the same period.
- On 9 July, several US officials revealed plans to permanently remove the \$230mn US military pier off the coast of Gaza.²² During its short lifespan of two months, the pier was frequently removed, repaired, and reconnected due to bad weather, resulting in only 20 operational days.²³ A total of 8800 metric tons of aid entered Gaza through the pier, the equivalent of 480 truckloads.²⁴ According to the original plans, the pier was supposed to deliver up to 150 aid trucks daily.²⁵

2. Creeping Annexation of the West Bank

On 19 July, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an Advisory Opinion on the legal consequences arising from Israel's policies and practices in the occupied Palestinian territory, determining that Israel's prolonged occupation is unlawful and must end as rapidly as possible.²⁶ The Court also concluded that the occupation had been transformed into a de-facto annexation and apartheid-like system.²⁷ This judgment coincided with continuous assaults by

²⁰ <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/reported-impact-snapshot>

²¹ <https://tinyurl.com/nha56cpf>

²² <https://apnews.com/article/gaza-pier-humanitarian-aid-israel>

²³ The details of the failed pier and maritime corridor mission are examined in previous issues of the Update:

<https://mas.ps/en/publications/10299.html>

²⁴ <https://www.timesofisrael.com/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-us-aid>

²⁵ <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/16/world/middleeast/>

²⁶ <https://www.icj-cij.org/node/204176>

²⁷ <https://tinyurl.com/4c8xtbdz>

Israeli settlers in the West Bank, approvals of settlement expansion by the Israeli cabinet, seizure of thousands of dunums in the Jordan Valley,²⁸ calls for annexing the occupied West Bank and extending Israeli civilian laws to an occupied territory.

2.1 Power Grab in the West Bank

Earlier in February this year, Israeli far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who also serves as a deputy minister in the Ministry of Defense and is well known for his aim to bankrupt the Palestinian Authority (PA), appointed a civilian deputy head of the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) for the first time in the history of the occupation.²⁹ This new position, created under Smotrich's pressure, gave him significant power over numerous civilian matters in the West Bank. On May 29, an order from the head of the Israel Defense Force Central Command formally implemented this change, allowing the head of ICA to delegate his areas of authority to the new deputy head.³⁰

The delegated powers include authority over real estate transactions, government property, land and water arrangements, settlement construction, outposts demolition, protection of most holy places, forestry laws, tourism, public bathing, urban planning, construction, infrastructure projects, land registration processes and management of regional councils.³¹ Essentially, all governing powers in the West Bank, except those related to security, were transferred from the Israeli military to an apparatus headed by Smotrich. The appointed deputy operates independently of the head of the ICA and reports solely to Smotrich. This shifted extensive power over civilian affairs in the West Bank from a military administration

bound by international law to civilian officials and Israeli elected representatives, whose primary loyalty is to Israeli citizens, settlers in particular.³² This move aligns with Smotrich's goal of de facto annexation through incremental steps.³³ It will have dire consequences for Palestinians in all areas of the West Bank, including Area "B" which by virtue of the Oslo Accords is outside COGAT jurisdiction, further limiting planning and development.

2.2 Archeological Annexation

On 7 July, the Israeli Ministerial Committee for Legislative Affairs approved a bill to expand the Israel Antiquities Authority's (IAA) powers into the West Bank, further cementing Israeli civilian control over the territory.³⁴ The Israel Civil Administration's archaeology unit manages archaeological sites in the West Bank. If passed, this bill would allow the IAA to enforce its standards throughout the West Bank as it does within Israel, a move aligned with the Smotrich agenda to exert more control over the West Bank.

This follows a decision by the Israeli cabinet in late June to empower ICA to take action against the destruction of heritage sites in Area B of the West Bank.³⁵ This decision effectively nullifies the Oslo Accords' governance distinctions regarding antiquities, granting the ICA Staff Officer for Archaeology permission to expand activities, restrict development, and carry out demolitions in areas designated as or suspected of containing antiquities in Areas B and A of the West Bank, which are under the PA administrative control. This is in conjunction with settlers' efforts to push to transfer the ICA Officer for Archaeology responsibilities to the Israel Antiquities

28 <https://peacenow.org.il/en/state-land-declaration-12000->

29 <https://tinyurl.com/yc8pceps>

30 <https://tinyurl.com/n78kd59b>

31 Ibid

32 <https://tinyurl.com/3kfsh9bh>

33 <https://tinyurl.com/mrxvr2ut>

34 <https://tinyurl.com/ycy7kprh>

35 <https://emekshaveh.org/en/cabinet-decision-area-b/>

Authority (IAA), using antiquities protection as a means to advance annexation.

Around 6,000 archaeological sites exist in the West Bank, with many in Areas A and B, where the Oslo Accords assigned management to the Palestinian Department of Antiquities and Cultural Heritage (DACH), operating under the PA's Ministry of Tourism. Almost every village or settlement in the West Bank contains archaeological and historical remains that need supervision to prevent damage. Expanding the Israeli authority into areas A and B marks another departure from the Oslo Accords. It further reduces the space available to Palestinians and violates international law and ethics. Israeli archaeological activity in the West Bank necessarily becomes an act of land appropriation and a deepening of Israel's hold on the West Bank. While Israel is expanding its activity in the West Bank under the guise of heritage protection, it is estimated that about 60% of the cultural and heritage assets in the Gaza Strip have been damaged in the current war. Moreover, Israel often ignores settler-led heritage site destruction, further undermining impartial archaeological activity.

2.3 West Bank Demolitions

As part of the annexation push, on 25 June, under the newly appointed Civilian Deputy by Smotrich, the ICA declared 12,700 dunams (1270 hectares) in the Jordan Valley as state lands, depriving people of their private property.³⁶ This is on top of 11,000 dunums of the West Bank declared state land this year alone.

On 18 July, the Israeli Central Command signed orders granting Israel enforcement, planning, and building authority in areas

under the PA control by the Oslo Accords.³⁷ The new orders allow the newly appointed Deputy of the ICA to demolish Palestinian structures in the "Green Areas" (or the "Agreed-Upon Reserve" in Israeli terms) in the West Bank, covering about 167,000 dunams (41,300 acres), or 3% of the West Bank. According to the Wye Agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from 1998, these areas were designated to fall under PA jurisdiction, but it was obliged to refrain from construction in those lands.

On 19 July, Israeli media reported that Smotrich is developing a plan to allow Israel to demolish buildings in the West Bank's areas A and B, which are under the PA control according to the Oslo Accords.³⁸ Smotrich aims to finish the plan within a month and present it to the Israeli cabinet for approval. Smotrich also plans to plant 10,000 dunums of trees in the West Bank in two forestation projects and is seeking approval for 50 illegal Israeli farms in the West Bank.

On 22 July, Israeli forces ordered citizens in the southwest of Hebron not to build in areas classified as Area B, threatening demolition if construction took place.³⁹ Officials in the Israeli military have noted that the ICA rejects 90-95% of Palestinian building requests in Area C of the West Bank, while it approves 60-70% of Israeli settlers' requests.⁴⁰

Since the beginning of 2024, Israel has demolished 890 structures in the West Bank, 176 of which are located in Areas A and B.⁴¹ In recent years, there has been a rapid increase in West Bank demolitions, rising from 422 structures in 2017 to 1177 structures in 2023.

37 <https://peacenow.org.il/en/israeli-government-assumes>

38 <https://tinyurl.com/jc6b2cut>

39 <https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/147235>

40 <https://tinyurl.com/jc6b2cut>

41 <https://tinyurl.com/3jjpkskz>

36 <https://peacenow.org.il/en/state-land-declaration-12000>

2.4 Pastoral Settlement

Since the start of the war on Gaza, 25 illegal outposts have been erected in the West Bank.⁴² Most of these outposts started as agricultural outposts aimed at seizing grazing areas. The Israeli security cabinet also approved the legalization of five outposts to make them official settlements. During this period, dozens of kilometers of access roads to outposts were opened, while hundreds of roads to Palestinian villages and farmland were blocked.

Israeli settlers are attempting to seize as much as possible of the West Bank land through pastoral settlement, where they graze livestock and establish tents, barracks, caravans, and pens. These areas, often fenced off to the reach of their livestock, eventually become settlement outposts or are designated as state lands or nature reserves, all under the protection of the Israeli army.⁴³ This type of settlement expanded through individuals from the extremist “Hill Youth” gang, who were trained, armed, and given the right to shoot if they felt threatened. The Israeli government now supports this practice, especially after Smotrich took control of the ICA.⁴⁴ Data from the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture shows that over the past six years, approximately ILS 1.66mn has been allocated to illegal agricultural farms in the West Bank, with an additional ILS 1.5mn approved but not yet disbursed.⁴⁵ These farm outposts are part of a broader oppression system to prevent Palestinians from accessing and reclaiming extensive lands in the West Bank.

Pastoral settlement is particularly dangerous, severely affecting Palestinian agriculture as settlers seize cultivated lands for grazing and attack local farmers, their livestock, and

their property. This, and the risk of Israeli settler councils confiscating their livestock,⁴⁶ has forced many to abandon traditional livestock rearing.⁴⁷ The practice also disrupts biological and environmental diversity, leading to vegetation cover deterioration, land desertification, food security issues, and forced displacement of Bedouin communities. Of greater concern is the social cohesion of an estimated 300,000 West Bank Bedouins in nomadic and settled communities facing these pressures, and their distinct culture embedded in Palestinians’ life.

3. Confiscation of Fertilizers

On 10 July, Israeli forces raided agricultural supply stores and nurseries across the West Bank, confiscating fertilizers and issuing warnings against dealing with agricultural materials that contain ammonia or what they called “illegal fertilizers”.⁴⁸ The Israeli army claims that these fertilizers are used to make explosives.⁴⁹ This action is part of Israel’s broader policy of restricting over 117 items under the ‘dual-use’ list from entering the Palestinian market, citing security concerns.

The economic impact of the dual-use restrictions is substantial. A 2019 World Bank report projected that easing these constraints could lead to additional cumulative growth of 6% in the West Bank and 11% in Gaza by 2025.⁵⁰ These restrictions mainly affect agriculture, manufacturing, and Information and Communications Technology (ICT). The Israeli dual-use list is problematic due to its lack of distinction between legitimate and illicit uses, opaque administration with no appeal process for Palestinian businesses, and an overly broad definition of certain items on the list. The list affects access to most civilian

42 <https://tinyurl.com/yfxz733c>

43 <https://alquds.com/ar/posts/48474?language=en>

44 <https://www.lrcj.org/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=24652307->

45 <https://peacenow.org.il/en/the-ministry-of-agriculture-funds->

46 <https://www.timesofisrael.com/high-court-bans-settlement>

47 <https://tinyurl.com/bddycs7b>

48 <https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/145787>

49 <https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-810840>

50 <https://tinyurl.com/bddtzrvj>

production lines and spare parts, most medical equipment, and most home appliances.

In agriculture, limited access to standard fertilizers has resulted in Palestinian land productivity being only half that of Jordan and 43% of Israel's, despite similar natural environments. The Palestinian Ministry of National Economy contends that these measures are designed to increase Palestinian economic dependency on Israel.⁵¹ The recent confiscations in the agricultural sector highlight the ongoing enforcement of these policies, undermining Palestinian economic development and self-sufficiency.

4. Strengthening Local Production Capabilities

On 12 June, the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) convened a roundtable on import substitution policies in light of the severe economic repercussions of the ongoing war.⁵² The primary proposal was to replace 36 imported commodities with locally manufactured goods, which could bolster economic recovery and resilience. Of these, 22 are imported exclusively from Israel, including mineral and carbonated water, certain food products, eggs, vegetables, fruits, fodder, and fertilizers. The remaining 14 are imported from Israel and other countries, including live animals, cement, telephones, chocolate and sweets, wheat, and rice. In 2022, imports under the identified commodities were valued at \$2.17bn, accounting for 24% of Palestinian imports.⁵³ Many of these products can be produced locally or are available through domestic producers. According to the background paper, replacing 50% of targeted imports could inject \$1bn into the economy and significantly boost employment, painting

a promising picture for early recovery efforts.

During the discussion, experts emphasized the need to establish an internal mechanism within the Ministry of National Economy (MoNE) to regulate the entry of certain goods, reactivate previous cabinet decisions on import substitution and trade reform, and develop new financing mechanisms for local industries. Participants also called for completing the Palestinian code, joining the Global Standards 1 (GS1), expediting the establishment of a national packaging institute, and reforming industrial licensing mechanisms. Palestinian companies are encouraged to improve product quality and benefit from the available industrial zones to reduce production costs while protecting workers' rights. Municipalities and institutional bodies are vital in leveraging public support for Palestinian products, encouraging investment, and developing industrial zones with enhanced infrastructure. Initially, the government could set a goal to increase the market share of Palestinian products from 10-12% to 20% through an integrated and comprehensive policy framework.

Palestinian imports dropped sharply following the war on Gaza. In Q4 2023, total imports decreased by 28.7% compared to Q4 2022 and by 27.5% compared to Q3 2023.⁵⁴ Imports from Israel, which constituted 57.3% of total imports in 2023, dropped by 29.2% and 28.2% over the same period. These changes are part of the enormous impact of the war, which includes a significant drop in aggregate demand, destruction of the Gaza Strip economy, loss of income for tens of thousands of workers in Israel and the local economy, rising shipping costs, and mounting Israeli restrictions on movement and access in the West Bank. In Q1 2024, total imports dropped further by 3.3% compared to Q4 2023, with an 8.6% decrease in imports from the rest of the world and a 0.5% increase in imports from Israel.

51 <https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/145834>

52 <https://mas.ps/news/10394.html>

53 <https://mas.ps/en/publications/10303.html>

54 https://pcbs.gov.ps/site/lang_en/712/default.aspx

Exports decreased sharply in Q4 2023 (22.5% compared to Q3 2023 and 27.8% compared to Q4 2022) but witnessed a partial rebound in Q1 2024 (16.1% compared to Q4 2023). The vulnerability of the Palestinian economy to political instability underlines the urgency of diversifying trade partners and strengthening domestic production capabilities.

4.1 Al Rabyeh Animal Feed and Grain Factory

The Al Rabyeh Animal Feed and Grain Factory, which began construction in 2020, commenced commercial production on June 12, with an initial capacity of 20 tons per hour and plans to upgrade to 40 tons per hour.⁵⁵ Conceived in 2018 with a \$20mn investment through a collaboration between the Palestine Investment Fund (PIF) and the Palestine Industrial Investment Company, a subsidiary of PADICO Holding Company, the project aims to reduce local reliance on imported fodder and achieve food security.⁵⁶ The West Bank consumes an estimated 800,000 tons of concentrated fodder annually, of which 69% is imported. Fodder is Palestine's second-largest imported commodity, at \$530mn annually. Achieving a degree of self-sufficiency in fodder production is a prerequisite for developing the potential of the Palestinian livestock sector.

Strategically located on 17 dunums northwest of Hebron, the factory is well-positioned to meet local demand and reduce transportation costs, mainly benefiting the southern West Bank, which accounts for 45% of the region's fodder demand. The factory's six-grain silos, with a storage capacity of 20,000 tons, help mitigate the risk of grain shortages and ensure a consistent and sustainable supply of fodder products. Palestine has a shortage of grain storage facilities as it mainly relies on private sector stockpiles and Israeli facilities for

immediate grain consumption needs.

Iyad Joudeh, Chairman of PIF, emphasized that the factory aligns with PIF's strategy to develop local capacities for strategic goods, reduce imports, and create jobs. The construction phase generated over 27,800 workdays, involving 20 Palestinian companies.

5. Free Trade Agreement with Brazil

On July 8, 2024, Brazil ratified a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the PA, initially signed by the Mercosur trade bloc and Palestine in 2011. Uruguay has supported the deal, but it is unclear if other Mercosur members would follow suit. The FTA aims to eliminate customs barriers, streamline trade procedures, increase trade volume, and promote mutual investment.⁵⁷ This FTA is expected to diversify Palestinian trade and enhance access to South American markets. The agreement's impact will depend on effective implementation and the ability of Palestinian businesses to seize these new opportunities.

In 2022, Palestinians imported \$43.5mn worth of goods from Brazil, mainly frozen and prepared meat (66%), coffee (19.4%), packaged medicaments (2.2%), and confectionery sugar (2.2%).⁵⁸ Palestinian exports to Brazil, dates (64.4%) and frozen fruits and nuts (35.5%), totaled \$0.8mn.

6. June Trading Activity

Al-Quds Index decreased by 2.3% in June 2024 compared to May 2023 and 19.6% compared to June 2023, reaching 524.9 points on the last trading day.⁵⁹ A total of 9.0mn shares worth \$14.7mn were traded during the month, marking a 33.1% decrease in the number and a 40.2% decrease in the value of traded shares compared to May 2024.

55 <https://tinyurl.com/2hk8ernn>

56 <https://alrabyeh.ps/ar/>


57 <https://aliqtisadi.ps/ar/Article/100677/>

58 <https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/pse/partner/bra>

59 <https://tinyurl.com/yc7z64ut>


Gross Domestic Product

Quarterly Real GDP (million USD in 2015 prices) in Palestine by Region, Q1 2022 - Q1 2024




Unemployment

Quarterly Unemployment (%) in Palestine by Region, Q1 2022 - Q3 2023




Inflation

Monthly Consumer Price Index (Base year = 2018) in Palestine by Region, January 2023 - June 2024




Trade

Monthly Export, Imports, Trade Deficit and Trade Deficit with Israel (million USD) in Palestine, January 2023 - May 2024



PMA Business Cycle Index

Monthly Palestine Monetary Authority Business Cycle Index, January 2023 - July 2024



Banking

Monthly Customer Deposits and Credit Facilities (million USD) in Palestine, January 2023 - May 2024

